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ROPER V. SIMMONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
There is a gap between the United States and the much of the world
on the issue of capital punishment.' Legal systems across the globe have
employed the death penalty since the beginnings of civilization, 2 and
colonial America inherited the practice from its British forefathers.3
Formerly, these multinational origins fostered concurrence on the ethi-
cality of capital punishment. Hence, when the framers of the United
States Constitution crafted the Eighth Amendment's 4 ban on "cruel and
unusual punishments," the death penalty fell outside of the Amendment's
ambit as capital punishment was deemed morally acceptable by both
American society and international standards.5 However, in the last few
decades, this common path has split.6 A global movement has emerged
that rejects capital punishment, compelling much of the world to abolish
its use.7 The United States has not embraced this movement as fully; and
the United States Supreme Court's slow abrogation of death penalty laws
under the Eighth Amendment has not matched the enthusiasm of its in-
ternational brethren.8  Consequently, a significant disparity has arisen
between the United States and the international community.9 This dis-
parity has played a volatile role in Supreme Court deliberations as the
Court has struggled to define what part, if any, international law should
have in the Court's decisions regarding capital punishment.
Recently, in Roper v. Simmons,'0 the United States Supreme Court
abolished the juvenile death penalty." The United States' use of the
1. See William A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in
BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 178, 210 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
2. Jeffery M. Banks, Student Article, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency
Under Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile Of-
fenders?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 327, 338 (2003).
3. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085, 1092 (2002).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
5. Koh, supra note 3, at 1091-92.
6. See Franklin E. Zimring, Postscript: The Peculiar Present of American Capital Punish-
ment, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 212, 213 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
7. Koh, supra note 3, at 1093-95. The recent swell of international opinion against capital
punishment flows from an "international human rights movement" triggered by the horrors of the
Holocaust and World War II. Id. at 1092-93. This movement has realized abolition throughout
Europe and much of the world. See id. at 1094-95. Currently, a total of 120 countries have abol-
ished the death penalty in law or practice. Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death
Penalty, http://www.amnesty.org (follow "Campaigns" hyperlink; then follow "The Death Penalty"
hyperlink; then follow "Facts and Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Facts and Figures on the Death
Penalty" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Amnesty International Facts & Figures].
8. Dana L. Bogie, Note, Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the United States and the New
Republic of South Africa, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229, 245 (1996).
9. Schabas, supra note 1, at 196.
10. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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juvenile death penalty emphasized its isolation from the international
community. The juvenile death penalty has been roundly condemned by
the international community; and before Roper, the United States re-
mained one of only seven countries in the world that continued the prac-
tice. 12 Thus, the Court's decision in Roper was made in the presence of
an unavoidable tension between the United States and the world commu-
nity. 13 In Roper, the Court not only acknowledged this tension but did so
with a discussion of international law more extensive than any previous
majority opinion regarding capital punishment.' 4  Therefore, Roper's
significance extends beyond the fact it abolished the juvenile death pen-
alty; Roper also marks a growing appreciation within the Court for the
validity of international law.
This comment will explore the history of international law in Eighth
Amendment analyses, its use in Roper, and the ramifications Roper's use
of international law could have for future Court decisions. Part I of this
comment will explain the history of international law within Eighth
Amendment analyses. Part II will review the cases that led up to Roper.
Part III will discuss the Roper decision itself. Part IV will examine the
Court's use of international law in Roper and argue why it was appropri-
ate. Part V will analyze the effect international law might have on the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI will consider
the implications Roper has for the use of international law in future Court
decisions.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSES
The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.' 15 The Eighth Amendment's omission of precisely what "cruel
and unusual punishments" it forbids has obliged judges to more specifi-
cally define its parameters. 16 Through the Court's gradual refinement of
the Eighth Amendment's criterions, it has established that to satisfy the
Amendment a punishment must be deemed unacceptable by society's
11. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
12. Id. at 1198-99.
13. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 196 (stating that in 1999 the Sub-commission on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights adopted a resolution that condemned the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by those under eighteen; this resolution specifically referred to
the United States).
14. The majority's discussion of international law in Roper uses 1,183 words, see Roper, 125
S. Ct. at 1198-1200. The only other majority opinions that come close to having such a long discus-
sion of international law are Trop v. Dulles at 153 words, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100,
102-03 (1958), and Stanford v. Kentucky at 151 words, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369
n. 1 (1989) (word counts include footnotes).
15. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (noting that the Constitution's
Framers delegated the task of defining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment to future
generations ofjudges).
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"evolving standards of decency." 17  The Court has consulted interna-
tional law to determine where this "standard of decency" rests, and occa-
sionally placed foreign sources of law alongside other indicia within a
"national consensus." 18
A. Evolving Standards of Decency and International Law
For eighty years, the Supreme Court looked backwards to try and
attune its assessment of what was cruel and unusual with societal stan-
dards existing at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adoption.' 9 The
Court's antiquated perception limited the Amendment's power to prohib-
iting only "inhuman and barbarous" tortures such as beheading, quarter-
ing, and crucifixion. 20 Then, in Weems v. United States,2' the Court de-
clared that what is cruel and unusual should not be bound to archaic and
"obsolete" ideas.2 2 Weems established that what is cruel and unusual is
not necessarily measured by a static standard, but rather can be altered by
the public's shifting opinions of what is "humane justice. 23 This notion
that what is cruel and unusual is perpetually changing was ensconced
into Supreme Court jurisprudence by Trop v. Dulles.2 4
In Trop, the Court considered whether a statute that stripped the Pe-
titioner of his United States citizenship as punishment for wartime deser-
tion constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment. 25 Here, the Court rea-
soned that the Constitution's vitality was intertwined with society's con-
temporary attitudes.26 Accordingly, what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment must be gauged by "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 27 Moreover, this standard does
not necessarily spring solely from American conceptions of "decency. 2 8
The Court concluded that the impugned law was unconstitutional after
noting that statelessness is "a condition deplored in the international
community of democracies," evidenced by a survey of eighty-four na-
tions of whom only two "imposed denationalization as a penalty for de-
sertion."29 The Court's acknowledgement of international norms estab-
17. Richard Heisler, The Kids Are Alright: Roper v. Simmons and the Juvenile Death Penalty
After Atkins v. Virginia, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 25, 31-32 (2004).
18. See Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002).
19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1972).
20. Furman, 408 U.S. at 264-65 (citing to Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); In re
Kemmler 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890)).
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
22. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
23. Id. Weems also set down another new test to guide Eighth Amendment analysis called the
"proportionality test." Under the proportionality test a punishment must be proportional to the crime
committed, or it is cruel and unusual. See id. at 367.
24. Heisler, supra note 17, at 32. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
25. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87, 99.
26. Id. at 100-01, 103.
27. Id. at 101.
28. See id. at 102-03.
29. Id.
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lished that an analysis of "standards of decency" is not limited to domes-
tic indicia but can include foreign sources as well.
The idea that a punishment's "cruelty" must be judged in light of
evolving standards of decency has guided the Court since Trop.30 How-
ever, in death penalty decisions arising between Trop and Roper v. Sim-
mons,31 the Court has only intermittently sprinkled international law into
this evolving standard of decency, often as little more than an after-
thought.32 Hence, until recently, international law's overall effect on
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been minimal.
B. The National Consensus and International Law
After Trop, the Court aggregated various tests of society's "stan-
dards of decency" into a "national consensus., 33 National and state leg-
islative activity is the foremost indicator of a national consensus. 4
However, the Court has considered other factors in determining the na-
tional consensus, and it is there that the Court has sometimes placed in-
ternational law.35
II. THE CASES LEADING UP To ROPER V. SIMMONS36
After World War II, societies in the United States and around the
world began to seriously question the efficacy and morality of the death
penalty. 37 In the United States, this movement raised doubts about the
death penalty that resulted in a seemingly mercurial standard of decency.
This standard urged the Court to abolish the death penalty in Furman v.
Georgia, 38 but then compelled the Court to uphold the death penalty
only four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.39 Since Gregg, the Court has
30. See Heisler, supra note 17, at 30-32.
31. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
32. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830-31 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 n.10 (1977).
33. See Heisler, supra note 17, at 32-33.
34. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. This national consensus is central to the Court's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment; however, the Court has repeatedly stated that it retains the right to dis-
agree with modem indicia if they do not comport with the underlying principles of the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 1185; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Coker, 433 U.S. at
597.
35. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.l0. In the national consensus
the Court has also included (1) the frequency with which a punishment has been used within the
States that permit it, see Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-93; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; (2) the official opin-
ions of professional organizations, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; (3) the attitudes of various
religious communities, id.; and, (4) public opinion polls, id.
36. 125 S. Ct. 1183.
37. See Koh, supra note 3, at 1093-94.
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ("The progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction
of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment...
Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
39. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ("[lI]t is now evident that a large proportion of American society
continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction." Id. at
179.).
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discerned a stabilization of the United States' standards of decency that
reflects a crawling trend against capital punishment. Accordingly, the
Court has moved with stuttering momentum to abolish the death penalty
among various classes of criminals.40
Meanwhile, the international community has consistently outpaced
the United States in abolishing death penalty practices, 4 1 and the conse-
quential alienation of the United States42 has stirred controversy within
the Court.43  Hence, the Court has vacillated as to whether the interna-
tional community's stance is relevant: the Court has alternately cited
international law as an affirmation of the Court's decisions, 44 overtly
dismissed international law as an inappropriate element within Eighth
Amendment analyses, 45 or ignored international law altogether. 46  The
Court's inconsistent application has frustrated the potential of interna-
tional law to become a significant and reliable factor in Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Four of the Court's decisions since Gregg bear par-
ticular significance to Roper and reflect the Court's shifting attitudes
towards international law.
A. Thompson v. Oklahoma
Fifteen year-old petitioner William Wayne Thompson first brought
the question of the juvenile death penalty's constitutionality to the Court
in Thompson v. Oklahoma.47 Thompson was a convicted murderer who
had been sentenced to die.48 In Thompson, the Court found that eighteen
States' bans on executions for juveniles under sixteen, and the scarcity of
such executions during the twentieth century reflected a national consen-
40. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded violates
the Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the execu-
tion of offenders fifteen years-old and younger violates the Eighth Amendment); Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that capital punishment of the criminally insane vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that capital
punishment for felony-murder criminals violates the Eighth Amendment); Coker, 433 U.S. at 600
(holding that capital punishment for rape is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
41. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 210.
42. Zimring, supra note 6, at 215.
43. The controversy within the Court over the United States' estrangement from the world in
its death penalty practices dates as far back as Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), when
Justice Goldberg objected to the Court's denial of certiorari to hear the case of a Petitioner sentenced
to death for rape. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889. Here, Justice Goldberg stated: "I would grant certiorari
in this case .... [i]n light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world against punish-
ing rape by death." Id. And the controversy has manifested as recently as 2002 when the Court
denied a stay to a seventeen year-old Petitioner sentenced to death in Patterson v. Texas. Patterson
v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002). Justice Stevens' dissent in Patterson echoes Justice Goldberg:
"Given the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international community
against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be appro-
priate for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity." Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
45. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n. 1 (1989).
46. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
47. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23.
48. Id.
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sus that objected to capital punishment of those fifteen and younger.4 9
The Court affirmed this conclusion by recognizing it was "consistent
with the views that have been expressed ... by other nations that share
our Anglo-American heritage., 50 Thompson abolished the death penalty
for juveniles fifteen and younger, but its limited ruling did not encom-
pass the execution of sixteen and seventeen year-olds; thus, the question
lingered if Thompson would soon impel the Court to strike down this
practice as well. 51
B. Stanford v. Kentucky
The Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment for
sixteen and seventeen-year olds a year later in Stanford v. Kentucky.
52
Here, the Court found no indications that the practice offended evolving
standards of decency.53 Fifteen states had explicitly banned the practice,
but this was not sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus that it was
immoral.54 Further, the Court explicitly dismissed the notion that inter-
national law had any bearing on its evolving standards of decency analy-
sis.
5
C. Penry v. Lynaugh56 and Atkins v. Virginia
The same day it decided Stanford, the Court addressed whether
capital punishment for the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual in
Penry v. Lynaugh.57 Like Thompson, the Court found no national con-
sensus objecting to the practice and ruled it did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.58 In Penry, the Court's discussion of the Eighth Amend-
ment did not mention international law.
Twelve years later, the Court reexamined the practice of executing
the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia.59 Now, the Court held that
evolving standards of decency did oppose executing the mentally re-
tarded. 60 Eighteen states had banned capital punishment for the mentally
retarded since Penry, signifying a new national consensus. 61 Moreover,
the Court rejected Stanford's notion that international law was irrelevant
and armored its national consensus with the posture of the world com-
munity who "overwhelmingly disapproved" of executing mentally re-
49. See id. at 826-29, 832-33.
50. Id. at 830.
51. See id. at 838.
52. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
53. Id. at 377.
54. Id. at 370-73.
55. Id. at 370 n.1.
56. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
57. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
58. Id.
59. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id. at 314-15.
[Vol. 83:1
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tarded offenders.6 2 Hence, the Court declared the execution of the men-
tally retarded to be "cruel and unusual. 63 The Court's acknowledgment
of international law in Atkins foreshadowed the approach it would take in
Roper.
III. ROPER V. SIMMONS64
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court reversed Stanford v. Kentucky.6 5
The Court found capital punishment for sixteen and seventeen year-old
offenders unconstitutional and thereby abolished the juvenile death pen-
alty. 66 This reversal, sixteen years after Stanford, was compelled by re-
cent legislative enactments 67 and international law 68 from which the
Court ascertained a new crest of modern decency.
A. Case History
Christopher Simmons was a seventeen year-old living in Missouri
when, with two friends, he formulated a plan to rob and murder a se-
lected victim.69 On the morning of September 9, 1993, Simmons and an
accomplice broke into the home of forty-six-year old Shirley Crook. °
The two youths undressed Crook, bound her hands, and taped her eyes
and mouth closed v.7 Crook was forced into her own mini-van, which the
youths drove to a railroad trestle that crossed a river; there the youths
placed a towel over Crook's head, hogtied her with cord, pushed her into
the river, and left.72 Later that day, fishermen found Crook's corpse. 3
B. Procedural History
Simmons was arrested and confessed to killing Crook; a trial court
found him guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.74
Simmons appealed his sentence to the Missouri Supreme Court, and the
Court was compelled to reconsider his case by Atkins v. Virginia' S7 cri-
76 oteria. In view of Atkins, the Court concluded that evolving standards of
decency had shifted since Stanford; the new national consensus con-
demned the execution of juveniles.77 This consensus was demonstrated
62. Id. at 316 n.21.
63. Id. at 316.
64. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
65. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
66. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197-98.
67. See id. at 1192-94.
68. See id. at 1198-99.
69. Id. at 1187.
70. Heisler, supra note 17, at 44-45.
71. Id. at45.
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id.
75. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
76. Heisler, supra note 17, at 47-48.
77. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 409 (Mo. 2003).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
by recent legislation among states banning the juvenile death penalty and
the fact that international opinion crushingly opposed the practice.
78
Accordingly, the Court declared the juvenile death penalty a violation of
the Eighth Amendment and commuted Simmons' death sentence to life
imprisonment without parole. 79  The Attorney General of Missouri ap-
pealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.80  The Court
granted certiorari in January, 2005.1
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme
Court's ruling and declared that modem standards of decency reject the
juvenile death penalty.82  The Court's conclusion hinged on the fact that
thirty states had abolished the juvenile death penalty.8 3 Also, as in At-
kins, the Court bolstered its conclusion with a discussion of international
law. 4 The Court noted that juvenile execution is prohibited by Article
Thirty-Seven of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child8 5 and the practice defies the "overwhelming weight of internationalopinion.,86 Of particular importance was the experience of the United
Kingdom: the Constitution's Framers modeled the Eighth Amendment
after a provision in the United Kingdom's English Declaration of Rights;
however, the United Kingdom had abolished the juvenile death penalty
within its own borders fifty-seven years before Roper.8 7 The Court fur-
78. Heisler, supra note 17, at 52-53.
79. State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
80. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198, 1200.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1200. The Court's independent proportionality review was also important to its
decision in Roper. In its proportionality analysis, the Court found that juveniles' impulsive natures,
undeveloped identities, and their inability to escape negative influences make them less likely than
adults to posses an "irretrievably depraved character" incapable of reform. Id. at 1195-96. Facing
this fact, the Court concluded that juveniles' circumstances result in a diminished level of moral
culpability that was exceedingly likely to be disproportionate to the punishment of death. Id. Also, a
juvenile's inherently volatile character minimized the probability of the death penalty's deterrence.
Id. at 1196. In light of this proportionality analyses, the Court concluded that "a line must be drawn,
and those under eighteen were ineligible for capital punishment." Id at 1197-98.
83. Id. at 1192-93. To reach this conclusion the Court discarded Stanford's assumption that a
national consensus was comprised only of the eighteen States that had explicitly rejected the death
penalty for juveniles. See id at 1193. Now, the Court included the twelve states that had abolished
the death penalty altogether. This approach deduced that thirty states opposed the juvenile death
penalty. Id. at 1193. However, of these States, only five had explicitly abolished the juvenile death
penalty since Stanford. Id. The Court conceded these five States did not mark an overt change in
the national consensus, but nevertheless found their abolition compelling because, "[i]t is not so
much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."
Id. (citing to Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
84. See id at 1198-99.
85. Id. at 1199. The Court also noted that Article Thirty-Seven of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by every country in the world except the United
States and Somalia. Id. (citing to Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm).
86. Id. at 1199-1200.
87. Id. ("The Amendment was modeled on a parallel provision in the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689, which provided: '[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required nor excessive Fines
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ther observed that the United States remained one of only seven coun-
tries that had executed juveniles since 1990, accompanied in its practice
by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China.88 The length and depth of the Court's discussion of
international law surpasses any previous Eighth Amendment case.8 9
D. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, took issue with the majority's con-
tentions that a national consensus rejected the juvenile death penalty and
that juries were unqualified to deliver such a sentence. 90 However, Jus-
tice O'Connor did reaffirm the jurisprudence behind the majority's ac-
knowledgment of international opinion, stating that the Eighth Amend-
ment's "special character" justified the Court's use of international law.91
2. Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent, was less generous than Justice O'Connor. Jus-
tice Scalia belittled the methods the majority used to arrive at a national
consensus. 92 He furthermore cast off the majority's acknowledgement of
international opinion and declared, "The premise ... that American law
should conform to the laws ... of the world ought to be rejected out of
hand., 93 Nor did Justice Scalia approve of the majority's recognition of
the United Kingdom's laws, warning that "if we took the Court's direc-
tive seriously," the Court might engage in absurdities such as curtailing a
defendant's right to a jury trial because, like juvenile capital punishment,
that too has been diminished in the United Kingdom.
94
IV. THE COURT'S USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ROPER V. SIMMONS
9 5
Justice Scalia's biting criticism of the majority's use of international
law fails in two respects: first, it ignores the Court's venerated history of
recognizing international law in its decisions; second, it overlooks the
invaluable insight international law can provide in Eighth Amendment
analyses.
imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted."') (citing to English Declaration of Rights,
1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 10 (Eng.)).
88. Id. at 1199.
89. See id. at 1197-98.
90. Id. at 1207-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1215-16.
92. Id. at 1217-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1226.
94. Id. at 1228.
95. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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A. The Tradition of International Law in Eighth Amendment Analyses
In fortifying Roper v. Simmons' evolving standards of decency
analysis with the principles of the international community, the majority
was following a long established tradition of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. The Court has appreciated the validity of international law in
rulings as far back as Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 96 in which the
Court declared that if possible a court must never construe law of the
United States in violation of "the law of nations. 97 Chief Justice Mar-
shall supported McCulloch v. Maryland's98 landmark ruling with the
weight of international opinion.99 Marshall further declared in The Ne-
reide'00 that lacking domestic statutory guidance the Court was "bound
by the law[s] of [other] nation[s]."'' And in The Paquete Habana,10 2 the
Court announced that "international law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice.,
103
Underlying the Court's recognition of international law are the legal
foundations the United States shares with other countries and the com-
mon realities they confront.1 4 Fundamental to the Bill of Rights, the
United States Constitution, and United States common law are ideas bor-
rowed from foreign legislatures, judiciaries, and intellectuals.'0 5 At the
country's inception, the ubiquitous nature of customary laws, like lex
mercatoria,10 6 precluded United States courts from distinguishing be-
tween international and domestic law; inevitably they often weaved in-
96. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
97. See The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
98. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
99. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 ("If any one proposition could command the uni-
versal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.").
100. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
101. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423.
102. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
103. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
104. See generally Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
265 (2003) (discussing how international law and foreign sources can assist interpretations of the
United States Constitution by providing empirical data, insight from parallel rules, and a source of
community standards).
105. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199 (stating that the Eighth Amendment was modeled after a
provision of the English Declaration of Rights); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 109-13 (2d ed. 1985) (1973) (explaining how the United States' common law was
strongly influenced by English common law); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 20 (Penguin Books 2000) (1999) (implying that James Madison's construction of the U.S.
Constitution was influenced by the governments of ancient Greece, the Swiss Confederation of
independent cantons, and the United Provinces of the Netherlands); BERNARD SCHWARTZ &
ROBERTO L. CORRADA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 65 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc.
2001) (1923) (stating that British intellectual John Locke's ideas about legislative delegation of
power heavily influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution); Lord Gordon Slynn, The Develop-
ment of Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 477, 478-79 (2005)
(stating that the English Magna Carta created the foundation for the U.S. concept of due process of
law).
106. Lex mercatoria is "transnational common law." Jean R. Sternlight & Judith Resnik,
Foreword, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure and ADR., 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV 481,485 (2005).
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ternational law into their rulings. 10 7  Therefore, although each country
matures in a way that reflects its unique circumstances, the United States
legal system is anchored by many of the same legal concepts that sustain
other societies. 10 8 Furthermore, as the United States and other civilized
countries have progressed along their respective paths, they have been
thrust into common realities by shared technologies, universal religions,
transnational cultural movements, and converging military conflicts.'
0 9
The Court has acknowledged the relevance of these familiar situations,
consulted the international community for insight, and found its guidance
particularly helpful with constitutional notions that implicitly suggest
review within a societal context such as "due process of law" and "cruel
and unusual punishment."110
107. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45
(2004).
108. See id. at 45-46. Justice Scalia has argued that this fact does not justify the Court's use of
international law. See Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997). Justice Scalia con-
tends that while foreign sources influenced many of the concepts embedded within the United States
Constitution, the system of government created under the Constitution is inimitable and inherently
incompatible with foreign laws and experiences. See id. ("We think such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the
task of writing one."). Scalia is correct that the United States enjoys a unique society and system of
governance; however, he does not explain why the Court cannot consult international law for guid-
ance while keeping the United States' unique qualities in view. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Nor does Scalia explain why the Court cannot learn from foreign experiences that
parallel the United States', but dismiss foreign experiences that are incompatible with the United
States'. See id. ("We are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there
may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own. But their
experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem.").
109. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. See Koh, supra note 107, at 46. Some commentators argue that this "societal context"
actually makes international law irrelevant as an interpretive tool in Eighth Amendment cases. See
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57,
59-60 (2004). These commentators cite the "international countermajoritarian difficulty" and con-
tend that foreign sources are inappropriate to understanding the Eighth Amendment within a societal
context because Eighth Amendment analysis hinges on a majoritarian paradigm-the national con-
sensus. Id. This argument posits that by allowing international opinions into the national consensus,
the Supreme Court is allowing foreign opinions to filter into what is intended to be an assessment of
strictly domestic indicia of public opinion. Id. The "international countermajoritarian difficulty"
argument fails in that it balances on the false perception that determining a "national consensus" is
the sole factor in Eight Amendment analyses; and accordingly, an Eighth Amendment analysis is a
simple majoritarian tally. The Court's emphasis on the "national consensus" in Eighth Amendment
decisions implies that the national consensus is a substantial factor in the Court's considerations.
However, the Court has explicitly stated that its "own judgment 'is brought to bear' on whether the
conclusions of the national consensus accord with Eighth Amendment principles; thus, in effect, the
national consensus must be approved by the Court. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002)
(citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). See also Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1185; Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). Therefore, Eighth Amendment interpretation does not hinge on a
majoritarian paradigm; rather, Eighth Amendment application is ultimately controlled by the Court's
own assessments of evolving standards of decency; these assessments have embraced the relevancy
of international law since Trop. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). Cf Koh, supra note
107, at 55 ("[T]his argument ["the international countermajoritarian difficulty"] assumes that the job
of judges construing the Constitution is to give expression to majoritarian impulses, when their long
settled role ... has been to apply enduring principles of law to evolving circumstance without regard
to the will of shifting democratic majorities.").
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International opinion first emerged as an applicable factor in Eighth
Amendment interpretation in Trop v. Dulles, where the Court looked to
the "civilized nations of the world" to advise its appraisal of evolving
standards of decency."' The Court echoed this practice in Coker v.
Georgia, Enmund v. Florida, and Thompson v. Oklahoma."2 But in
Stanford v. Kentucky," 3 the Court eschewed the notion that international
opinion was significant in Eighth Amendment analyses.1 14  Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority stated, "We emphasize that it is the
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the con-
tention . . . that the sentencing practices of other countries are rele-
vant."'115 So, for over a decade, international opinion disappeared from
the Court's considerations of the Eighth Amendment. Then, in Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court reclaimed its prerogative to consult international
opinion and recognized the world community's "overwhelming disap-
proval" of executing mentally retarded offenders. 16  Thus, Justice
Scalia's disallowance of international law in Roper collapses in the face
of precedent: the Court has acknowledged the benefit of using foreign
authorities in constitutional interpretation since its beginnings and has
employed international law within Eighth Amendment analyses as far
back as Trop'" and as recently as Atkins. "8
B. Why Roper's Consideration of International Law Makes Sense
Tradition itself does not imbue a rule with vitality; a relevant rule
must retain efficacy in a contemporary application; therefore, it is worth
putting aside precedent to consider the reasoning behind Roper's dis-
sent."19 In his dissent, Justice Scalia declared that the "premise ... that
American law should conform to the laws. . . of the world ought to be
rejected out of hand."'' 20 This statement mirrors his dissent in Thompson:
"The views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution."' 2' Justice Scalia is correct that imposing the views of
other nations upon the United States through the power of the Supreme
Court would be a dangerous undertaking. 22 The Constitution and the
Eighth Amendment were established to guide American society; accord-
111. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
112. 487 U.S. 815, 830-31(1988).
113. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
114. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n. 1 (1989).
115. Id.
116. Atkins, 536U.S. at316n.21.
117. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03).
118. Atkins, 536U.S. at316n.21.
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is...
revolting if the grounds upon which [a law]... was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.").
120. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ingly, flexible concepts like evolving standards of decency take their
cues from the American people. 12 3 If these concepts were infiltrated and
modeled after an international opinion incongruent with America's own
beliefs Justice Scalia would indeed be admonishing a significant threat to
the United States' autonomy. However, Justice Scalia's contention that
the Roper decision is a vehicle to inflict international law on the United
States legal system shrugs off the majority's actual use of international
opinion. 124  Roper's ruling is not the result of international coercion;
rather, only after it conducted its own evolving standards and proportion-
ality analyses, did the majority consult the world community.125 More-
over, the majority realized it has an obligation to consider international
law when interpreting "cruel and unusual punishment," an expression
whose use predates the United States' 26 and whose fundamental nature
has long been reflected by the values of "the civilized nations of the
world.' l2 7 Absurd as a Court might be that "[imposes] the views of other
nations ... upon Americans through the Constitution,"'' 28 equally absurd
would be a Court that eschews the legal acumen of foreign countries, but
also pretends to thoroughly understand a concept whose modem applica-
tion is informed by international notions of civility.
29
Justice Scalia was further troubled by the majority's statement that
the United Kingdom's ban on the juvenile death penalty "bears particular
relevance here."' 30  Justice Scalia pointed out that the United Kingdom
has different laws than the United States regulating jury trials, thus, "If
we took the Court's directive seriously, we would also . . . curtail our
right to jury trial in criminal cases.' 3' Here, Justice Scalia assumes the
majority's rationale, if followed to its logical end, prescribes the haphaz-
ard incorporation of international law into United States jurisprudence.
32
123. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
124. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (noting that world opinion is not controlling in its decision).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1199 (stating that the Eighth Amendment was modeled after a provision in the
English Declaration of Rights enacted in 1689).
127. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
128. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a
Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address, in 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 383, 387
(1994). Justice Blackmun stated:
Refusing to consider international practice in construing the Eighth Amendment is con-
venient for a Court that wishes to avoid conflict between the death penalty and the Con-
stitution. But it is not consistent with this Court's established construction of the Eighth
Amendment. If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the 'evolving stan-
dards of decency' of the civilized world, there can be no justification for limited judicial
inquiry to the opinions of the United States. Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no
less than that of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the
global opinions of mankind.
Id.
130. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1227-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1228.
132. See id.
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Justice Scalia ignores the majority's actual use of international law. 133 By
acknowledging international law, the majority did not advocate that the
Court indiscriminately embrace -legal concepts because they are favored
by the international community any more than Justice Scalia, by his dis-
missal of international law, was contending that the Court indiscrimi-
nately reject legal concepts because they are favored by the international
community. 134 Instead, the majority recognized that if an overwhelming
number of countries with whom the United States shares basic mores
disavow a particular practice, their rejections give rise to question
whether that practice comports with America's own standards of de-
cency. 35 Likewise, if the United States finds itself upholding a practice
that is endorsed only by nations whose values are glaringly dissimilar to
its own, that too is a reason to question whether that practice abides by
American standards of decency. 1
36
The issue of juvenile execution provided the majority with an ideal
context to apply this reasoning. Not only did countries with whom the
United States shares historic ties "overwhelmingly disapprove" of the
juvenile death penalty, the United States' only international counterparts
in the practice - Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, and China - are nations that hold many
fundamental values strikingly different than the United States'. 137 This
conspicuous association called into question whether the juvenile death
penalty accorded with America's own moral principles. 138 Therefore, the
majority soundly reasoned that it was compelled to find "confirmation"
from members of the international community with whom the United
States does share like values, not only to advise its own assessment of
modem standards of decency, but to emphasize the universality of the
fundamental rights that underlie America's convictions of justice and
sustain its dignity. 1
39
133. Id. at 1198.
134. See id. at 1198-99. See also Koh, supra note 107, at 56. Koh notes that:
What this claim misunderstands is that those who advocate the use of international and
foreign sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation are not urging U.S. courts to defer
automatically to some kind of global 'nose count.' Instead, they are suggesting that prac-
tices of other mature democracies-not those that lag behind developmentally-constitute
the most relevant evidence of what Eight Amendment jurisprudence calls the 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'
Id.
135. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1199-1200.
138. See Koh, supra note 107, at 51-52.
139. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200 ("It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride
in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom.").
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V. THE EFFECT OF ROPER V. SIMMONS140 ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT JU-
RISPRUDENCE
The Court's discussion of international law in Roper v. Simmons en-
tails the lengthiest and most comprehensive discussion of international
law ever to issue from the Court's majority in an Eighth Amendment
decision. 141 This fact suggests that the reemergence of international law
in Atkins v. Virginia142 was not a fluke: international law is again a factor
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. If the Court carries this trend for-
ward and regularly employs international law within its "evolving stan-
dards of decency" analyses, international law may prove to be of increas-
ing consequence in the Court's assessments of what is cruel and unusual.
Eventually, Roper's most resounding after-effects could manifest in
future cases challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment.
143
Abolitionists who seek to persuade the Court that the death penalty is
"cruel and unusual" have invoked international law as a source of per-
suasive precedent, 144 and Roper demonstrates that international law can
be an effective tool towards this end. However, the potential of interna-
tional law to effectuate judicial abolition is tempered by two factors.
First, the potency of international law has increased within Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, but it is still secondary to the Court's domes-
tic national consensus. Given the popularity of capital punishment in the
United States, a contemporary national consensus would likely reflect
domestic approval for the death penalty. 45 Second, a notable number of
140. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
141. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-1200.
142. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
143. Symposium, Death Penalty and International Law, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305,
308 (2004).
144. See Koh, supra note 3, at 1129 ("The evidence strongly suggests that we do not currently
pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of the death penalty. For that
reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in violation of the Eighth Amendment");
Geoffery Sawyer, Comment, The Death Penalty Is Dead Wrong: Jus Cogens Norms and the Evolv-
ing Standard of Decency, 22 PENN ST. INT'L REV. 459, 459-60 (2004)( "As more of the world looks
upon the death penalty as unfair, or cruel and unusual, or as torture, arguably, a jus cogens norm
prohibiting the death penalty has developed in international law, and will ultimately be the vehicle
by which the death penalty will be abolished worldwide.").
145. This projected national consensus is based on the following facts: (1) currently thirty-eight
states employ the death penalty; (2) fifty-nine prisoners were executed in the United States in 2004;
(3) approximately 3,400 prisoners are currently sentenced to death, Amnesty International Facts &
Figures, supra note 7; (4) A May, 2005 Gallup poll indicated seventy-four percent of Americans
approved of the death penalty for offenders convicted of murder-this reflects an eight percent in-
crease since 2000, Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Views of Death Penalty More Positive This Year,
GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, May 19, 2005, LEXIS, Gallup Poll News Service (on file with au-
thor); (5) there have been notable state death penalty reforms and state moratoriums in recent years,
see Death Penalty Information Center, Changes in Death Penalty Laws Around the U.S.: 2000-2005,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=236&scid=40 (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (listing
changes in several states' death penalty policy and statutes). However, these facts alone are not
likely to demonstrate the "consistency of direction of... change" the Court requires to determine
that a national consensus disapproves of the death penalty, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
countries reject capital punishment, 46 but this is not on balance with the
world's "overwhelming" disapproval of the juvenile death penalty in
Roper.147 International sentiment seems to be culminating against the
death penalty, and could eventually reach the point of "overwhelming"
rejection. 48 But as it stands, world opinion on capital punishment does
not carry the same weight as with the juvenile death penalty issue, and its
effect would be nugatory. Nor has abolition of the death penalty become
so common that it is clearly an international norm, orjus cogens, under
which it could be argued that the United States' retention of the death
penalty violates international law. 149 Thus, international law will likely
effect future Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and could ultimately
prove a useful instrument for abolitionists; but Roper does not suggest
that the current influence of international law alone can impel the Court
to abolish capital punishment.
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A GROWING TREND
The significance of the majority's acknowledgement of interna-
tional law in Roper v. Simmons 50 reverberates beyond the Eighth
Amendment; Roper also represents the Court's growing acceptance of
international law as a source of persuasive authority in its general ap-
proach to Constitutional interpretations. This controversial trend may be
slowed by opponents in the Court and the United States Congress, but
neither of these obstacles seems capable of stopping this trend altogether.
A. The Trend Towards Acknowledging International Law in the Court
1. The Rise of Transnationalist Jurisprudence
Until roughly fifty years ago, the United States judiciary was virtu-
ally the only legal system in the international community that undertook
judicial review. 151 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court looked
inward for precedent. 52  Then, the global reconfigurations of the post
World War II era created numerous constitutional courts that took no-
tions of jurisprudence from the United States, among other sources, and
146. 120 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice, and seventy-six coun-
tries retain the death penalty. Amnesty International Facts & Figures, supra note 7.
147. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
148. The international trend against the death penalty is evidenced by the fact that over fifty
countries have abolished the practice since 1985. Amnesty International Facts & Figures, supra note
7.
149. Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35
GEO. J. INT'L L. 547, 555-56 (2004). But see Sawyer, supra note 144, at 470 (arguing that although
the number of countries that have explicitly banned the death penalty do not establish a jus cogens
norm, a jus cogens norm can be found in an "amalgamation of various non-derogable rights" present
in "treaties and positive law sources" and "from that mixture make the conclusion that a jus cogens
norm has been established prohibiting the death penalty internationally.").
150. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
151. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks, in 14 GERMANY AND
ITS BASIC LAW 411,411-12 (Paul Kirchof& Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
152. Id. at 412.
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rendered them into their own laws.153 Over time, these courts produced a
reserve of precedent and judicial contemplations that, until recently, has
been largely ignored by the United States Supreme Court.154 However, a
rising "transnationalist jurisprudence" movement within the Court has
recently begun to utilize these foreign precedents as well as other sources
of foreign jurisprudence.' 55 This movement invites international law into
Court jurisprudence because: (1) it finds international law useful as a
correlative canon of jurisprudence to advise the Court's own estimations
of constitutional standards; 156 and (2) it regards the acknowledgment of
international law as a means of maintaining international comity.
57
Roper is the latest in a procession of Court decisions indicating that the
ideals of transnationalist jurisprudence are becoming increasingly ac-
cepted by the Court.
Roper's recognition of international law sprang from the Court's
acknowledgment of the world community's "overwhelming disapproval"
of executing mentally retarded offenders in Atkins v. Virginia.'5 8 Also, in
2003, international law played a role in two other notable Supreme Court
cases: Grutter v. Bollinger'59 and Lawrence v. Texas. 6  In Grutter, the
Court considered the constitutionality of affirmative action.' 6' Justice
Ginsburg, concurring, cited to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in her explanation of
the constitutional standards for race-conscious programs.' 62 Similarly, in
Lawrence, the Court struck down Texas's sodomy law after recognizing
that "the right the petitioners [sought] ... [had] been accepted as an in-
tegral part of human freedom in many other countries.' 6 3  Lawrence
furthermore marked the first time the Court's majority cited to a Euro-
153. Id. See also Martha F. Davis, Don't 'Gag' U.S. Courts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 2004, at 19,
19 col. 2 ("The Supreme Court of Canada, the supreme courts of India, Israel and South Africa, the
European Court of Justice and many other high courts have strong traditions of looking to U.S.
precedents as they shape their own domestic law."), available at 8123104 Nat'l L. J. 19, (Col. 2)
(Westlaw).
154. Rehnquist, supra note 151, at 412.
155. Id. Though Chief Justice Rehnquist showed little use for international law in recent Court
decisions he foresaw its rise in 1989, stating, "The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our
country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other
countries. But I predict that with so many thriving constitutional courts in the world... that ap-
proach will be changed in the near future." Id
156. Koh, supra note 107, at 56.
157. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) ("Comity is not a vague political concern favoring interna-
tional cooperation when it is in our interest to do so ... When there is a conflict, a court should seek
a reasonable accommodation ... that considers ... the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning international regime.").
158. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002)).
159. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
160. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
161. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
162. Id. at 344 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
163. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
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pean Court of Human Rights case. 164 The Court recently revealed that its
enthusiasm for transnationalist jurisprudence is limited when it dismissed
certiorari in Medellin v. Drake,165a case that raised important issues re-
garding international comity. 166 Yet Roper's acknowledgment of inter-
national law, taken in conjunction with the Court's use of international
law in Atkins, Grutter, and Lawrence signals that, overall, the Court's
appreciation for transnationalist jurisprudence is ripening.
2. Nationalist Jurisprudence
Railing against the Supreme Court's recognition of international
law are the Court's proponents of "nationalist jurisprudence": Justices
Scalia and Thomas.167 Nationalist jurisprudence recognizes the role anti-
quated international influences played in forming the United States legal
system, 168 but views modern United States society as an exceptional
paradigm incompatible with foreign experiences and international law.
169
This ideology regards the Court's consultation of international law as the
infliction of foreign principles upon Americans, 170 and it further rejects
the notion that the Court should consider international comity as a basis
for its decisions. 171 Instead, nationalist jurisprudence insists that domes-
tic authorities are the Court's only legitimate sources of judicial revela-
tion. 172  However, the influence of nationalist jurisprudence has floun-
dered recently and it seems unable to curtail the transnationalist jurispru-
dence trend.
164. See Koh, supra note 107, at 50.
165. 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
166. Medellin raises the issue of what the United States legal system's obligation is to Peti-
tioner Medellin and other convicted foreign nationals in light of an International Court of Justice
decision declaring that the United States' conviction of Medellin without consular access violates the
Vienna Convention. See 125 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (discussing Avena and other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31)). In Medellin, the Court's dismissal of certiorari was predi-
cated on the presumption that Medellin's case would be retried in a Texas court, where it would
emerge "unencumbered" of procedural issues and allow the Supreme Court to review the issues
raised by the International Court of Justice. Id. at 2090 n. 1. Thus, transnationalist jurisprudence may
yet play a role in deciding the issues of Medellin.
167. Koh, supra note 107, at 52.
168. The admiration proponents of nationalist jurisprudence hold for international sources that
pre-date the United States is demonstrated by Justice Scalia's dissent in the recent Hamdi v. Rums-
feld decision in which Justice Scalia quotes at length eighteenth century British jurist William Black-
stone to establish the background of "due process." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2661
(2004).
169. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.1 1(1997).
170. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Law-
rence, 538 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[T]his Court... should not impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans."') (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring))).
171. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769-70 (1993) (stating that interna-
tional comity is not a bar against using Sherman Act jurisdiction over a foreign claim).
172. Koh, supra note 107, at 52.
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3. Chief Justice Roberts and the Departure of Justice O'Connor
Following the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Senate has ap-
proved John Roberts, Jr. as the new Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. 73  Chief Justice Rehnquist opposed transnationalist ju-
risprudence while he served on the bench.174 Chief Justice Roberts has
similarly disparaged the Court's use of international law as a "misuse of
precedent,"'175 indicating that he, like his predecessor, rejects transnation-
alist jurisprudence. Also, Justice O'Connor has announced her intention
to retire subsequent to the confirmation of her successor. 176  Justice
O'Connor generally accepted the use of international law in Court deci-
sions, 177 so confirmation of a "nationalist" Justice to replace her could
soften the impact of international law in future Court rulings. Yet, even
in this scenario, there will remain five justices who either promote or
accept the Court's use of international law making it unlikely that the
Court will dismiss international law from its jurisprudence any time
soon. 178
B. Legislation Opposing the Court's Use of International Law
The amplified status of international law within the Court has of-
fended some members of Congress, who have in turn proposed legisla-
tion to restrain its use. This backlash was sparked by the Court's recogni-
tion of international law in Lawrence179 and further compounded by the
Roper decision. Congressman Bob Goodlatte made a statement the day
after the Court decided Roper that exemplifies the discontent of those in
Congress who oppose transnationalist jurisprudence: "The opinions of
foreign governments have no place in interpreting the original meaning
of the Constitution, and it is high time that these justices be reminded
that their duty is to interpret the Constitution, not to impose the will of
173. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elizabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief Jus-
tice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
174. Koh, supra note 107, at 52 n.62.
175. Confirmation Hearing of John Roberts, Jr., 109th Congress (Sept. 13, 2005) (responding
to a question from Sen. Kyl), available at 2005 WL 2214702.
176. President Bush recently nominated Harriet E. Miers to replace Justice O'Connor, but, as
this article went to press, Ms. Miers withdrew. It remains to be seen who replaces Justice O'Connor.
177. See id. at 52 n.67.
178. Justices Breyer and Ginsberg are the Court's two most enthusiastic champions of transna-
tionalist jurisprudence. Id. at 52. Justices Stevens and Souter are also "regular members of this
camp." Id. at 52 n.67. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy has recently demonstrated an increasing accep-
tance of transnationalist jurisprudence, id., underscored by his lengthy acknowledgement of interna-
tional law in Roper. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-99. These five judges make up a majority on the
Court who accept the use of international law in Court decisions.
179. H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) ("Whereas the Supreme Court has recently relied on the
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions ... in Lawrence v. Texas ... inappropri-
ate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the
United States.").
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foreign entities on the people of the United States."'' 80 Congress' dissat-
isfaction with Roper gave rise to two pieces of proposed legislation: (1)
the Reaffirmation of American Independence Act,18' an act intended to
express the outrage of Congress; and (2) the Constitution Restoration
Act, l1 2 an act structured to halt the Court's use of international law.
1. The Reaffirmation of American Independence Act
The Reaffirmation of American Independence Act, popularly
known as "The Feeney Resolution," was originally introduced into Con-
gress in 2004 by Congressman Tom Feeney; 8 3 there the Act was passed
out of committee and debated on the House floor. 184 The Act resolves
"to [express] the sense of the House of Representatives" that "judicial
determinations should not be based in whole or in part on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions. ' 8 5 Two weeks after
Roper, Feeney re-introduced this Act into Congress; it is currently in
committee. 186 If passed, the Reaffirmation of American Independence
Act notifies the Court of Congress's grievances; but its declaration is not
binding and cannot oblige the Court to limit itself to domestic sources.'
87
A more ambitious threat to the Court's use of international law arises
from The Constitution Restoration Act.
188
2. The Constitution Restoration Act
The Constitution Restoration Act is proposed legislation that forbids
"a court of the United States ... to rely upon any constitution, law, ad-
ministrative rule, Executive order, directive, [or] judicial decision ... of
any foreign state or international organization or agency.' ' 189 The penalty
for violating the Act is considerable: a judge employing one of the
aforementioned "foreign" resources in her decision has committed an
impeachable offense. 190 However, the likelihood of this Act finding req-
uisite support for passage into law remains uncertain' 9' and if it is en-
acted, the Act will probably not survive judicial review.
192
180. Hadar Harris, "We Are the World" -Or Are We? The United States' Conflicting Views
On the Use of International Law and Foreign Legal Decisions, 12 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5, 7
(2005).
181. H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/feeney/downloads/
reaffres.pdf.
182. S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005).
183. H.R. 568, supra note 181
184. Harris, supra note 180, at 7-8.
185. H.R. 568, supra note 181
186. The act was reintroduced as H.R. Res. 97. 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm.
187. Davis, supra note 153
188. Harris, supra note 180, at 8.
189. S. 520, supra note 182
190. Id.
191. Congress Moves to Restrict Court Rulings on God, VT. GUARDIAN, May 18, 2005,
http://www.vermontguardian.com/dailies/0904/0518.shtml (stating that the Constitution Restoration
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Ultimately, these acts alone do not present a significant threat to the
transnationalist movement. Still Congress has the capacity to complicate
the Court's use of international law: the presence of the aforementioned
acts, combined with Congress' public criticisms of the Court and its
power to impeach a sitting justice,193 could create a political environment
hostile to international law that will cause Justices to hesitate before turn-
ing to foreign sources.1 94 This intimidation would be unlikely to coerce
Justices away from international law completely, but it could decelerate
the transnationalist jurisprudence movement.
Yet none of the forces aligned against this movement are likely to
substantially undermine the Court's growing appreciation for foreign
sources, and it is probable that international law will play an increasing
role in Court rulings. Specifically, this trend could be significant in the
forthcoming case of Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England,195 set for oral argument before the Court in November, 2005.196
Ayotte deals with the Constitutionality of New Hampshire's Parental
Notification Prior to Abortion Act and has raised references to interna-
tional law and foreign sources in support of the Petitioner's argument.,
97
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court's lengthy acknowledgment of foreign sources in
Roper v. Simmons1 98 manifests a reemergence of international law within
the "evolving standards of decency" analysis that may effect the Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment with greater potency than in the
past.199 This blossoming recognition of international law does not stem
from the Court's enthusiasm to impress foreign beliefs on American citi-
zens, but rather from its understanding that the views of all humanity are
relevant when deciding what is cruel and unusual.200  Furthermore,
Act is sponsored by twenty-eight members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Sen-
ate).
192. Harris, supra note 180, at 8.
193. For a discussion of Congress' power to impeach a sitting justice see David R. Fine, Opin-
ion, No Politics in Third Branch, NAT'L L.J. Dec. 26, 2004, at 30 col. 2 available at 12/6/2004 NLJ
30, (Col. 1) (Westlaw).
194. See Davis, supra note 153.
195. 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005).
196. The Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov (follow "Oral
Aguments" hyperlink; then follow "Argument Calendars" hyperlink"; then follow "Session Begin-
ning November 28, 2005" hyperlink).
197. See Brief of University Faculty for Life as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioner, Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL
1912326, at *1 ("[R]esort to international law regarding abortion provides little guidance for this
Court. To the extent such guidance does exist, it supports the right of parents to be involved in the
care and treatment of their daughters, and thus supports the petitioner in this case."); Brief of the
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, and John M. Thorp, Jr., M.D. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL1902074, at *9 (citing studies
done in Finland an England to support Petitioner's argument).
198. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
199. See Symposium, supra note 143, at 308.
200. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Roper, taken in light of other recent decisions by the Court, signals the
Court's rising awareness of the cogency of international law and its ap-
plication beyond the Eighth Amendment. Staring down this trend are the
Court's proponents of nationalist jurisprudence and dissatisfied members
of Congress. However, despite the opposition of these groups, interna-
tional law will likely continue to weigh into the Court's Constitutional
interpretations, and could be significant to forthcoming Court cases.
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